Building a Secure Home Hosting Network with pfSense and Verizon Fios

By Mike Levin

Understanding Secure Home Networks for Hosting: Getting Started

If you’ve ever thought about running your own website, cloud storage, or game server directly from your home, you might realize that simply plugging it into your regular internet setup isn’t the safest option. Standard internet routers provided by companies like Verizon Fios are designed for convenience but often lack the robust security features needed when exposing services to the public internet. If someone were to compromise your home-hosted server, they could potentially gain access to your entire home network, including personal computers and devices.

This article explores a more secure approach called network segmentation. The core idea is to use a dedicated, more powerful firewall device to create isolated zones within your home network. One crucial zone is often called a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which houses your public-facing servers. This setup acts like a buffer, allowing traffic to reach your server but strictly preventing anything malicious on the server from reaching your trusted internal network. The text documents one person’s journey in selecting the right hardware (a specialized mini-PC) and software (pfSense, an open-source firewall system) and configuring it to work with a typical Verizon Fios connection, laying the groundwork for safer home hosting.

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The Secure Foundation: Taking Control of Your Home Network for Hosting

The dream of hosting services from home – a personal website, a private cloud, a game server – offers unparalleled control and flexibility. But this power comes with responsibility. Simply opening ports on your standard ISP-provided router can be akin to leaving your front door unlocked, potentially exposing your entire home network to threats if your public-facing server is compromised. This article chronicles a detailed, practical journey towards building a more secure network foundation using pfSense, specifically tailored for users with services like Verizon Fios, tackling the initial hurdles and setting the stage for safer home hosting.

The Initial Hurdle: Limitations of ISP-Supplied Gear

Most residential internet setups, like those provided by Verizon Fios, involve an Optical Network Terminal (ONT) converting the fiber signal to Ethernet, which then feeds an ISP-branded router (e.g., the Verizon CR1000A). This single box typically handles routing, Wi-Fi, DHCP, NAT, and basic firewalling. While convenient for everyday use, it presents limitations for secure hosting:

1. Lack of Granular Control: ISP routers offer limited firewall customization, making it difficult to implement robust segmentation rules.
2. Flat Network Risk: Connecting a home server directly to the ISP router (even using its “DMZ” feature, which often just forwards all ports) places it on the same logical network as your personal computers, phones, and smart devices. A compromise of the server could allow an attacker lateral movement within your trusted network.
3. The “Switch Illusion”: Placing a simple network switch between the ONT and the ISP router is a common misconception. ISPs usually provide only one public IP address. A switch doesn’t route or assign IPs; it merely connects devices on the same segment. This approach fails to provide isolation or even reliable connectivity for multiple devices trying to grab the single public IP.

The Goal: True Network Segmentation via a Dedicated Firewall

To securely host services, the standard best practice is to implement a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This isn’t just a router setting; it’s a separate network segment isolated from your internal network by a capable firewall. This requires introducing your own dedicated router/firewall appliance into the chain, placed between the ONT and your existing ISP router (which can then be repurposed).

The topology shifts to:

Internet -> ONT -> Your Firewall -> [DMZ Port -> Server] & [LAN Port -> ISP Router -> Internal Devices]

Your dedicated firewall becomes the primary gateway, managing the public IP, routing traffic, and enforcing strict rules: allow specific traffic to the DMZ server, but critically, block traffic from the DMZ server to your internal network.

The Hardware Quest: Finding the Right Tool for the Job

Selecting the right hardware for this dedicated firewall is crucial. The requirements often include:

• Multiple Gigabit (or faster) Ethernet ports (at least 3: WAN, LAN feed, DMZ).
• Sufficient processing power for routing and firewalling at line speed.
• AES-NI CPU support (for efficient VPN performance, if needed later).
• Low power consumption and small footprint.
• Local Management: Crucially, avoiding cloud-dependent, subscription-based devices.

The journey involved considering, and discarding, several options:

• QNAP NAS: Using a multi-port NAS seemed clever but posed a significant security risk. Hosting the public service directly on the firewall device means a server compromise could grant control over the firewall itself.
• Old Routers (WRT54GS): While historically hackable, these devices are severely underpowered (slow CPUs, 10/100 Mbps ports), creating an unacceptable bottleneck for modern internet speeds like Fios Gigabit. Finding secure, up-to-date firmware is also challenging.

The search culminated in identifying purpose-built mini PC firewall appliances as the ideal solution. Brands like Protectli, Qotom, and various generic vendors (Topton, HUNSN, etc.) offer compact, often fanless boxes with multiple Intel NICs, designed specifically for running open-source firewall distributions like pfSense or OPNsense.

The specific hardware chosen in this journey was a Topton N100-based appliance, configured with:

• CPU: Intel N100 (Alder Lake-N, efficient and capable)
• RAM: 8GB DDR5
• Storage: 128GB NVMe SSD
• NICs: 4x Intel i226-V 2.5GbE ports
• Features: Fanless, AES-NI, HDMI/DP for console access

This configuration provides ample performance for multi-gigabit routing/firewalling, sufficient RAM and storage for the OS and common packages, and reliable Intel network interfaces, all without vendor lock-in or subscriptions. A portable HDMI monitor was also acquired for easier initial setup.

The Software: pfSense (Pre-Installed)

While OPNsense and even NixOS were considered viable (and compatible) options for this hardware, the chosen appliance came pre-installed with pfSense, a mature, powerful, and widely used open-source FreeBSD-based firewall distribution.

Step-by-Step: Initial pfSense Setup and Network Integration

With the hardware acquired and pfSense ready, the practical setup began:

1. Console Connection: The Topton box was connected to the portable monitor, keyboard, and mouse.
2. Initial Boot & Console Menu: On first boot, pfSense presents a console menu. (Note: A port labeled “COM” on such hardware is for serial console access, not network traffic like WAN).
3. VLAN Question: pfSense prompts: “Do VLANs need to be set up first?”. For creating physically separate LANs using different ports (the goal here), and unless the WAN connection itself requires a VLAN tag (uncommon for Fios ONT Ethernet), the correct answer is No. VLANs (virtual LANs running over a single physical port) can be configured later via the web interface if needed.
4. Interface Assignment (Crucial Console Step): pfSense needs to know which physical port serves which function.
   • The console lists available interfaces (e.g., igc0, igc1, igc2, igc3 for the Intel 2.5GbE ports) and asks the user to assign WAN and LAN.
   • The Ethernet cable from the Verizon ONT was connected to one physical port, and its corresponding interface name (igc0, igc1, etc.) was assigned as WAN.
   • A different physical port was chosen for the primary internal network connection, and its interface name was assigned as LAN. (Additional ports for DMZ, etc., can be assigned here or later).
5. Accessing the WebConfigurator:
   • A computer was connected directly to the physical port assigned as LAN on the pfSense box.
   • A web browser was opened to the default pfSense LAN IP: http://192.168.1.1.
   • Login used default credentials (admin/pfsense).
6. Basic Web Configuration:
   • WAN: Verified the WAN interface (Interfaces -> WAN) was set to DHCP (or DHCP6 for IPv6) to correctly receive its IP configuration from the Verizon ONT. Checked Status -> Interfaces to confirm it received a public IP.
   • LAN: Verified the LAN interface (Interfaces -> LAN) had the static IP 192.168.1.1 and that the DHCP server was enabled (Services -> DHCP Server -> LAN) to provide IPs to devices connected to it (like the management computer).
   • Initial Test: Verified basic internet connectivity from the computer connected directly to the pfSense LAN port.

Taming the Beast: Reconfiguring the Verizon Router

A common stumbling block occurred next: simply plugging the original Verizon Fios router (Model CR1000A in this case) into the pfSense LAN caused issues. Why? IP Address Conflict. Both pfSense (default 192.168.1.1) and the Fios router (default 192.168.1.1) were trying to control the same network space. Furthermore, the Fios router was still trying to be a router.

The solution was to demote the Fios router to a simple Access Point and Switch:

1. Isolate Fios Router: Disconnected the Fios router from pfSense. Connected a computer directly to a LAN port on the Fios router.
2. Log into Fios Router: Accessed its admin page (still at http://192.168.1.1 at this point).
3. Locate LAN Settings: Navigated through the menus (typically Network -> Network Connections -> Edit “Network (Home/Office)” profile on the CR1000A).
4. Change LAN IP: Changed the Fios router’s own LAN IP address to something on the pfSense network but outside the pfSense DHCP range (e.g., 192.168.1.2). Subnet mask remained 255.255.255.0.
5. DISABLE DHCP Server: Found the DHCP Server setting within the same LAN profile section and disabled it. This ensures only pfSense assigns IPs.
6. Save and Apply: Saved the changes on the Fios router.

The Final Connection and Verification:

1. Connect LAN-to-LAN: Connected an Ethernet cable from a LAN port on the reconfigured Fios router (now at 192.168.1.2) to the primary LAN port on the pfSense box (192.168.1.1). The WAN port on the Fios router remains unused.
2. Test:
   • Confirmed devices connected (wired or wirelessly) to the Fios router now received IP addresses from pfSense (192.168.1.x range, gateway 192.168.1.1).
   • Confirmed internet access worked correctly through this setup.
   • Confirmed access to both web interfaces: pfSense (http://192.168.1.1) and the Fios router (http://192.168.1.2).
   • (Real-world tip: When changing the Fios router’s Wi-Fi password after this setup, client devices like phones often need to explicitly “Forget Network” before they will connect successfully using the new password.)

Current Status: Foundation Laid

At this point, the network topology is vastly improved. The dedicated pfSense firewall controls the internet connection and serves as the primary gateway. The original ISP router functions purely as a switch and Wi-Fi access point for the trusted internal network, sitting securely behind pfSense.

This configuration provides the necessary control and segmentation capabilities. The next logical steps on the home hosting journey include:

1. Configuring the DMZ: Assigning another physical port on the pfSense box (e.g., the one intended for the web server) to a new interface (e.g., OPT1), renaming it “DMZ,” giving it a separate IP subnet (e.g., 192.168.10.1/24), enabling DHCP or setting static IPs for servers within it, and configuring the critical firewall rules to allow specific inbound traffic while blocking DMZ-to-LAN traffic.
2. Handling Dynamic IP: Since a static IP wasn’t requested from the ISP, setting up Dynamic DNS (DDNS) within pfSense (using services like DuckDNS, No-IP, Cloudflare API, etc.) or configuring a Cloudflare Tunnel is necessary to reliably map a domain name to the changing home IP address.
3. Server Setup: Configuring the actual server hardware (Raspberry Pi, old laptop, etc.), possibly using NixOS as planned for portability, and deploying the web server software (like Jekyll behind Nginx/Apache).

Conclusion: Control and Confidence

Setting up a dedicated firewall like pfSense is a significant, but achievable, first step towards secure home hosting. While it involves navigating hardware choices, understanding network concepts like DMZs and IP conflicts, and performing careful configuration, the result is a network foundation that offers vastly superior control, visibility, and security compared to relying solely on ISP equipment. This foundational work paves the way for deploying home-hosted services with greater confidence, knowing that robust measures are in place to protect the internal home network.

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AI Analysis

• Title/Headline Ideas:
  • Building a Secure Home Hosting Network with pfSense and Verizon Fios
  • From Fios ONT to Secure DMZ: A pfSense Firewall Setup Guide
  • Taking Control: Replacing Your ISP Router with pfSense for Safer Hosting
  • Step-by-Step: Installing pfSense on a Mini PC for Fios Home Network Security
  • Securing Your Home Lab: A Practical pfSense Implementation Journey
• Strengths:
  • Provides highly specific, actionable steps for a common technical goal (setting up pfSense with Fios).
  • Clearly explains the reasoning behind choosing a dedicated firewall and segmentation over ISP defaults.
  • Addresses and provides solutions for common practical hurdles (e.g., the “switch illusion,” IP address conflicts with the ISP router).
  • Documents the specific hardware chosen (Topton N100) and configuration details (interface assignment, Fios router AP mode), which is valuable for others considering similar builds.
  • Acknowledges future steps, setting context for ongoing work (DMZ, DDNS).
• Weaknesses:
  • Assumes a relatively high level of technical understanding (networking concepts, console interfaces, basic firewall principles).
  • The narrative “journey” format, while illustrative, might be less direct than a purely instructional guide for some readers.
  • Lacks visual aids (network diagrams) which could significantly improve comprehension of the topologies discussed.
  • While setting the foundation, it stops short of configuring the actual DMZ rules and server setup, which are critical parts of the overall security goal.
  • Focus on specific hardware (Topton N100, CR1000A) might require adaptation for users with different gear.
• AI Opinion: This article provides significant value as a detailed, practical walkthrough for users looking to implement a pfSense firewall for secure home hosting, particularly within the Verizon Fios ecosystem. Its strength lies in documenting not just the steps but also the common pitfalls (like the ISP router IP conflict) and the specific hardware/software choices made. While its technical depth and journal-like structure might make it challenging for absolute beginners, it serves as an excellent resource or log for intermediate users undertaking a similar project. It clearly outlines the foundational steps necessary before proceeding to more complex DMZ and server configurations.